The Impact of Democratization on the Making
of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and
the Philippines by Dosch, Jörn
www.ssoar.info
The Impact of Democratization on the Making
of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines
Dosch, Jörn
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dosch, J. (2006). The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines. Südostasien aktuell : journal of current Southeast Asian affairs, 25(5), 42-70. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-336978
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
42 Südostasien aktuell 5/2006
Studie
The Impact of Democratization on the Making
of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and
the Philippines
Jörn Dosch
Abstract
For the most part foreign policy in Southeast Asia has been regarded and analyzed as an
isolated policy area, separated from the structures and dynamics of the respective political
systems. This seemed to be an appropriate approach as long as foreign policy was the
domain of small political élites and autocratic regimes. Assuming that the processes of
(re-)democratization in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have not only resulted in
new national political orders but also have had an impact on foreign policy making the
article will delve into the following questions: Do formal institutionalized and informal
mechanisms and patterns exist to open the decision-making process beyond the special
foreign policy interests of small political elites, and to make those interests subject to
intra-systemic checks and balances? And has democratization led to the broadening of actor
participation in the formulation of foreign policy interests and strategies? The study will
look particularly at the role of the armed forces, parliaments and civil society organisations
in the making of foreign policy. (Received July 28, 2006; accepted for publication August 30,
2006)
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Abstract
Die Außenpolitiken der südostasiatischen Staaten sind bisher zumeist als isolierte Poli-
tikfelder ungeachtet der Strukturen und Dynamiken der jeweiligen politischen Systeme
betrachtet und analysiert worden. Ein solcher Zugriff schien so lange akzeptabel zu sein,
wie sich Außenpolitik als die Domäne kleiner politischen Eliten autoritärer Staaten ab-
bildete. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass sich die Demokratisierung der Philippinen,
Thailands und Indonesiens in weitreichendem Maße nicht nur auf die jeweiligen nationalen
politischen Herrschaftsordnungen, sondern auch auf das Feld der Außenpolitik ausgewirkt
hat, widmet sich der Aufsatz vor allem den folgenden Fragen: Existieren formale und infor-
male Verfahren der Einﬂussnahme und Kontrolle, die sicherstellen, dass außenpolitische
Entscheidungsprozesse nicht mehr länger ausschließlich die Interessen kleiner politischer
Eliten reﬂektieren? Und, damit zusammenhängend, hat die Demokratisierung der drei
betrachteten polities zu einer Erweiterung des Akteursfeldes bei der Formulierung au-
ßenpolitischer Interessen und Strategien geführt? Die Studie geht dabei insbesondere auf
Rolle und Einﬂuss des Militärs, der Parlamente und zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen
bei der Formulierung von Außenpolitik ein. (Eingereicht am 28.7.2006; angenommen zur
Veröffentlichung 30.8.2006)
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Introduction: Crossing the Domestic-International
Divide in the Study of Foreign Affairs
Why did Philippine President Gloria Macapacal Arroyo decided to withdraw the
country’s troops from Iraq in exchange for Filipino hostage Angelo de la Cruz in
2004, despite immense pressure from the United States and its allies not to give in
to the demands of Iraqi militants?1 Why, on the other hand, did the killing of two
Thai soldiers in Karbala in December 2003 – the ﬁrst Thai troops to lose their lives
on an overseas battleﬁeld since the Vietnam War – initially not change the overly
positive attitude within the country toward the military mission in Iraq? And
why have subsequent democratically legitimized governments in Jakarta struggled
to revive the golden days of Indonesian diplomacy under President Suharto’s
autocratic rule, when the country enjoyed the role and status of a regional leader?
The answers to all three questions lie in the domestic sources of foreign policy
making.
In 1967, British political scientist Peter G. Richards complained about the
lack of academic research on the various actors involved in the process of foreign
policy making. In his view, the neglect of parliaments and societal forces in most
analyses, for example, was partly due to the fact that foreign affairs “tend to be
overlaid by other issues” and “are generally considered a matter for the executive
branch of government” (1967, p. 13). Some four decades on this assessment still
holds true to a large extent. While publications on the domestic-international
nexus, the President versus Congress pattern and the role of public opinion
in American foreign policy ﬁll entire libraries; other countries have not been
widely analyzed in this regard. Even in the case of most European states studies
on the domestic dynamics of foreign policy are rare. What primarily matters
to scholarly observers and policymakers alike is the visible actions of states on
the international stage. The underlying internal processes that inﬂuence and
1 Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the British Academy’s Southeast Asia
Committee, which is gratefully acknowledged. Core ﬁndings are mainly based on interviews which
I conducted with, government ofﬁcials, parliamentarians and scholars in Indonesia, the Philippines
and Thailand during various short visits between 2002 and 2005. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the East West Center, Honolulu/Hawaii. The feedback I received greatly helped me to
improve my arguments. I am also thankful for the constructive criticism of the two anonymous
reviewers. An empirically and theoretically more detailed and signiﬁcantly extended version of this
article will appear in Jörn Dosch (forthcoming).
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drive state behavior often remain in the dark.2 The lack of attention is mainly
due to the seemingly unchanging reality of executive dominance in the foreign
policy process. In the mainstream view, unlike almost all other policy areas the
conduct of foreign affairs was always, and remains, in the hands of presidents,
prime ministers and government departments. According to this rather narrow
perspective, any involvement by state and non-state actors other than the executive
branch of government in foreign policy can safely be deemed marginal.
There are a few notable exceptions, though. One of the most inﬂuential
contributions to foreign policy analysis has been the metaphor of the two-level
game as introduced by Robert Putnam (1988) and developed further by many
others since (especially Evans et al. 1993). The two-level game framework is the
“central analytical device ... to span the domestic international divide” (Caporaso
1997, p. 567). It follows the idea that “the relationship of states to the domestic
and transnational social context in which they are embedded have a fundamen-
tal impact on state behavior in world politics” (Moravcsik 1997, p. 513). The
two-level game links the national and international context of decision-making.
At the national level, domestic constituencies pressure the government to adopt
policies they favor. At the same time governmental actors seek power by building
coalitions among these constituencies. At the international level, governmental
actors seek to satisfy domestic pressures while limiting the harmful impact on
foreign relations. Thus, political leaders must simultaneously play both the in-
ternational game and the domestic game. The requirement that decision-makers
satisfy both domestic constituencies and international actors is what produces con-
straints on foreign policy behavior. In sum, while the two-level game emphasizes
negotiating behavior, it also serves as a metaphor for understanding the impact of
domestic inﬂuences on the broad spectrum of foreign policy decisions (Trumbore
and Boyer 2000, p. 680). Joe Hagan amends Putnam’s approach by introduc-
ing a further analytical layer. He correctly stresses that political leaders “must
engage in two, not one, domestic political games involving diverse opposition
actors with different goals and interests” (Hagan 1993, p. 4). The ﬁrst imperative
of this dual domestic game is coalition policy-making, or the requirement that
agreement is to be achieved among actors who share the authority necessary for
committing the resources of a nation to a particular course of action in foreign
policy. The necessity for coalition-building is rooted in what Vincent Pollard calls
2 Among the few studies that have looked at the he convergence of national and international systems
are James N. Rosenau’s path-breaking edited volume Linkage Politics (1969).
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“stretched organizational pluralism,” which “generically refers to the extent to
which the foreign policy power is shared, willingly or unwillingly, with other
individuals and institutions” (1998, p. 5). The second feature of the two-fold
domestic embeddedness of foreign policy making is retaining political power, or
the imperative to maintain and, if possible, enhance the political support base
necessary for holding on to political power (Hagan 1993, pp. 4-5). In other words,
“foreign policy decision-makers are not simply agents of the national interest but
political animals who must worry about their survival in ofﬁce and the viability
of their overall set of political goals, domestic and foreign” (Skidmore and Hudson
1993, p. 3). However, the two-level-game approach does not explain the impact of
domestic factors on foreign policy making in different regime types. It does not
differentiate between democracies and autocracies but explains that regardless the
respective political system, no senior governmental actor is completely immune
from intrastate pressure. In principle, strong government agencies, insulated
groups of technocrats, or rival actors (the military for example) can challenge and
inﬂuence the foreign policy making of authoritarian leaders as effectively as can
societal forces, NGOs, or parliaments in liberal democracies. Yet, while both
authoritarian and democratic leaders generally face a similar pattern of constraints
when confronted with decisive decisions about their countries’ external relations,
the degree of pressure on decision-makers seems to vary greatly according to the
overall structure in which foreign policy making is embedded. The inﬂuence of
non-governmental actors in the foreign policy arena is prominently related to
the way in which regime accountability constraints the government’s latitude of
decision-making in foreign affairs. In an authoritarian state regime, accountability
tends to be low because the procedures for power transfer are not institutionalized.
The continuity of a regime is not linked to the legislative process, elections, judi-
cial decision, or even the regime’s performance. Hence, accountability does not
impose a signiﬁcant limitation on foreign policy making in authoritarian polities.
In contrast, democratization increases regime accountability and, as a result, re-
stricts the regime’s leeway in determining and implementing foreign policy goals
(Park, Ko, and Kim 1994, p. 173). In this regard David Skidmore and Valerie
Hudson (1993) differentiate between two ideal models, the statist and the pluralist
approach, which show that regime accountability is a crucial variable. The statist
model is most likely to be found in a non-democratic environment. In extreme
cases, foreign policy is guided by a national interest that is narrowly deﬁned and,
over time, very consistent. Given their almost absolute insulated position within
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the state and its political system, foreign policy decision-makers can safely ignore
societal interests and even opposition. As a result, the conduct of foreign policy
is almost free of domestic constraints (Skidmore and Hudson 1993, pp. 7-8). In
the antipodal pluralist model, the case of a quasi-unlimited open and responsive
democratic system, foreign policy choices are inevitably linked to their perceived
effect on the decision-maker’s political standing in his or her constituency. In
such an environment the vast majority of foreign policy options go along with
societal division and political mobilization either because the material interests
of various groups are affected differently – producing both winners and losers
– or because foreign policy choices provoke ideological conﬂict over values and
purposes. By that, any given policy choice on an important international issue
will stimulate a range of support and opposition. A good example of the pluralist
element in foreign relations is the strong impact of Japanese public opinion and
local politics, toward the US military presence in Okinawa, on the state and
future of the US-Japanese security alliance (S. Smith 2000). While both statist
and pluralist models are ideal types, which – in their pure forms – are seldom
resembled by political reality, it is nevertheless possible to observe signiﬁcant
shifts and changes on a scale between these two ultimate points.
As for the study of foreign affairs in Southeast, for the most part the foreign
policies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and other states in the region
have been regarded and analyzed as an isolated policy area, separated from the
structures and dynamics of the respective political systems. This seemed to be an
appropriate approach as long as foreign policy was the domain of unaccountable
autocratic regimes and their small political élites. In the early 1980s, for example,
none of the three governments would have lost much sleep over the interests of
domestic actors. Southeast Asia’s small political elites operated within autocratic
or at best semi-democratic environments and hence were able to follow and
implement narrowly deﬁned national interests, which were largely unconstraint
and unchallenged by competing political actors, civil society groups, or a critical
media. Foreign policy tended to be separated from domestic politics and, within
the ﬁeld of foreign relations and security – understood as hard security or the
management of threat to the integrity of the nation – ranked highest on the
political agenda. However, the making of foreign policy under the condition of
democracy is on the whole fundamentally different from the way authoritarian
regimes shape their relations with their external environment. Since the beginning
of (re-)democratization – counted from the year of the ﬁrst democratic elections
48 Jörn Dosch
that followed the most recent authoritarian regime – in the Philippines (1986),
Thailand (1992) and Indonesia (1999) the foreign policy arenas have opened up
to the extent that groups from outside the executive branch have forced their
governments to pay more prominent attention to issues such as human rights and
environmental matters in foreign affairs and blocked or signiﬁcantly re-shaped
governmental initiatives toward other countries. In order to understand and not
least predict the behavior of states on the chessboard of international relations, it
is inevitable to open the black box and identify the domestic structures and actors
that impact on foreign policy.
The following analysis of foreign policy making in Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand is based on the proposition that democratization in these polities
has altered the two-level game due to: (1) gradually changing formal and informal
rules and procedures that govern foreign policy making; (2) increasing regime
accountability, which imposes a signiﬁcant limitation on the government’s deci-
sion-making power; and (3) growing state autonomy from social elites, especially
the armed forces and cronies, and decreasing state autonomy from civil society and
intermediate actors, such as parliaments, that try to exert inﬂuence over foreign
relations. As the result, one can observe a shift from a statist to a pluralist model
of decision-making. In making this argument the article delves into the following
two questions:
1. On the structure of foreign policy making: Do formal institutionalized and
informal mechanisms and patterns exist to open the decision-making process
beyond the special foreign policy interests of small political elites, and to make
those interests subject to intra-systemic checks and balances?
2. On the actors involved in foreign policy making: Has democratization led to the
broadening of actor participation in the formulation of foreign policy interests
and strategies? Who are those actors?
The understanding of democracy used here is based on Wolfgang Merkel’s con-
cept of “embedded democracy,” which goes beyond Robert Dahl’s deﬁnition of
polyarchy (Dahl 1971) and “consists of ﬁve partial regimes: a democratic electoral
regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and
the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically
elected representatives” (Merkel 2004, p. 36). However, I will not discuss the
degree of democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand,
but rather analyze how and to what extent democratization – that is, the transition
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from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule to a democratic political system
(independent variable) – has changed the structures of, and actors involved in, the
process of foreign policy making (dependent variable) in these three polities.
Formal and Informal Institutions in Foreign Policy
Making
Provisions concerning the conduct of foreign policy can be found within the
formal institutional architecture of both the authoritarian and the democratic
regimes of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. As one would expect, their
respective constitutions are the main sources for norms and rules related to foreign
affairs, including the respective roles and duties of the executive and legislature
in areas such as the negotiation and implementation of international treaties,
declaration of war, and command and control of the armed forces. However, a
comparison of pre-democratic and democratic constitutional provisions reveals
signiﬁcant differences in Indonesia and the Philippines. Different formal concepts
of foreign policy are partly due to informal institutions, such as traditional percep-
tions of the head of state’s role and speciﬁc experiences in the respective nation’s
history. In Indonesia, the constitution of 1945 institutionalized a very strong
role for the president. Nine of the thirteen articles of the pre-1999 constitutional
text that dealt with the presidency provided powers to the president. Limitations
and checks and balances on the president were not given. As Juwono Sudarsono
observed in 1994 toward the end of the Suharto regime, Indonesia’s autocratic
leader took maximum advantage of this institutional framework: “Even more
than in most presidential systems, in Indonesia it is the President – not the foreign
minister – who is the chief diplomat. It is President Soeharto who has set the
tone and decided on the timing of various foreign policy initiatives that have been
taken over the last 25 years or so” (reprinted in Sudarsono 1996, p. 66). Although
two amendments made after the downfall of Suharto in 1998 have strengthened
the role of the Indonesian parliament (the House of People’s Representatives,
DPR], core provisions related to foreign policy remain unchanged. Article 11
gives the president almost unrestricted authority over foreign policy. Neither
international treaties nor a declaration of war require the formal consent or any
other formalized participation of the Indonesian parliament. Article 11 only
asks for the “agreement” of the legislature without institutionalizing any rules
specifying the procedure of how any agreement should or must be reached.
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The hegemonic position of the Indonesian president can only be understood
and explained within the context of informal institutions and structures, par-
ticularly cultural factors and the inﬂuence of history on the nation’s political
system. First, the strong position of the chief executive corresponds with the
traditional Javanese concept of absolute power. At least until the end of the
Suharto regime, large numbers of Indonesians, especially Javanese, perceived the
president essentially as a king: “On numerous occasions presidential behaviour
is more easily understandable in cultural terms as that of a traditional monarch
[rather than as] a modern head of state” (Surbakti 1999, p. 62). Second, the
constitution and the role of the president are rooted in the anti-colonial struggle
and a strong sense of nationalism, including a wide range of sacrosanct national
symbols. In the view of both the drafters of the constitution and subsequent
political elites, a successful process of nation building required strong political
leadership in all policy areas, including foreign policy (for details, see Leifer 2000;
Weinstein 1972). One of the most important national symbols and a core element
of the consensus-driven and non-negotiable blueprint for Indonesia’s external
relations has been the doctrine of a free and active foreign policy (politik bebas dan
aktif ) introduced by the ﬁrst vice president, Mohammad Hatta. Following the
popular understanding of this guiding principle, the policy is independent because
Indonesia does not side with world powers. At the same time Indonesia’s foreign
policy is active to the extent that the government does not maintain a passive or
reactive stand on international issues but seeks active participation in their settle-
ment. Third, politics in Indonesia are characterized by a distinct inter-relationship
between foreign policy and domestic politics. For example, except for a short
period during the national revolution, Indonesian governments have been keen
to avoid the inﬂuence or even dictates of Islamic considerations in foreign policy:
“They have sought to avoid incautious engagement in international issues which
might be exploited either to advance claims presented by Muslim groups or to
enhance the political standing of Islam in the Republic” (Leifer 1983, p. xvi). In
sum, foreign policy of both the Sukarno regime and the Suharto government fell
into the statist model and can be described as a blocked two-level game, because
structural factors, both formal and informal, prevented, as far as possible, the
participation of actors other than the president and a very small group of political
elites. Although the respective constitutional provisions in Indonesia have not
been changed since 1998 (with the exception of Article 13, which institutionalizes
the DPR’s participation in the process of ambassadorial appointments), foreign
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policy making in the era of democratization no longer seems to be guided by the
once powerful informal institutions of the authoritarian past. It will be shown
below that, despite the lack of new constitutional procedures in the area of foreign
policy, actors outside the executive, particularly the DPR, are already successfully
inﬂuencing the management of Indonesia’s external relations.
Unlike political change in Indonesia, the re-democratization of the Philippines
has brought about important implications for formal procedures of foreign pol-
icy making. On 21 September 1972, then-president Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law, closed the Philippine Congress and assumed its legislative responsibil-
ities. During the 1972-1981 martial law period, Marcos, invested with dictatorial
powers, issued hundreds of presidential decrees. The constitution of 1973 further
strengthened his position. In order to restrict the power of future presidents and
reduce the risk of dictatorship, the democratic constitution of 1987 introduced
an elaborated system of checks and balances partly modeled on the US political
system. The Philippine Congress is one of the most powerful legislatures in the
Asia Paciﬁc, as far as its role in foreign policy making is concerned, and has played
its cards on several occasions. In particular, Article 7, Section 21 (“No treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate”) has proven to be a strong and
decisive instrument of the legislature. Of the three states analyzed here, it is in
the Philippines that the two-level game in the foreign policy process comes closest
to Putnam’s model.
In Thailand, political change in the aftermath of the 1991 coup d’etat has
not resulted in any new formal framework conditions for foreign policy. Al-
though Thailand’s constitution of 1997, the sixteenth since 1932, brought about
far-reaching implications for the nation’s political system (see Croissant and Dosch
2001), the content and wording of the two sections related to foreign policy have
remained practically unchanged compared with the previous, military-oriented
constitution of 1991. The king as head of state has the prerogative to declare
war with the approval of the bicameral National Assembly (Sections 180 and 223
respectively), and to conclude international treaties. Treaties that provide for a
change in the Thai territories or the jurisdiction of the state, or that require the
enactment of legislation for implementation, must be approved by the National
Assembly (Sections 181 and 224 respectively). However, judging foreign policy
making in Thailand solely on the basis of formal constitutional structures would
be too simplistic a view. The almost identical constitutional passages hide the
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fact that today’s decision-making process is open to a wider spectrum of actors.
During the times of imperialism and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, Thailand’s
foreign policy followed a realist pattern based on the primacy of security. This,
and the role of the military as a legitimate instrument of state policy, contributed
to a pre-eminent position of the armed forces in foreign policy making. Even
more, the military regularly monopolized the decision-making process, excluding
the parliament and even the foreign ministry at times. As a result of the democra-
tization process, the institutionalization of civilian control over the armed forces
and the subsequent decline of the military’s power to intervene in politics have
signiﬁcantly reduced the generals’ authority over foreign affairs (see Rüland 2001,
p. 1027).
The Declining Role of the Military
One of the most visible results of regime change has been the declining role of the
armed forces as a major foreign policy actor and the revival of foreign affairs as a
civilian domain.3 As already explained, during Suharto’s ‘New Order’ (1966-1998)
Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making was characterized by a pre-eminent
position of the President. Former Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja
once admitted that all strategic foreign policy decisions, such as the normalization
of Indonesia’s relations with China in 1990, were made by Suharto without any
signiﬁcant contribution form other actors.4 At the same time this hegemonic role
would not have been possible without the strong backing of the armed forces. On
the basis of the dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine, stipulating a dual political
and security function for the military, the armed forces claimed the right to be
represented in the government, the legislature and the state administration. In
the area of foreign policy this assertion materialized in a military-dominated
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), despite the fact that all three foreign ministers
of the ‘New Order’ were civilians. According to Bob Hadiwinata, “although some
diplomats of civilian background (Ali Alatas, Nana Sutresna, Hasyim Jalal and
some others) did make a good career in the foreign service, it does not necessarily
3 For the most comprehensive analysis of the armed forces’ political role see Alagappa, ed. (2001).
4 At a seminar at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in September 1987.
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say that civilians had their grip in foreign policy-making.”5 Other military agencies
were also involved in inﬂuencing, if not determining, New Order foreign policy,
including Hankam (Ministry of Defense and Security), Bakin (Intelligence Body),
BAIS (Intelligence and Strategic Organization), Lemhanas (Institute of Defense
and Security), and Setneg (State Secretariat) (Suryadinata 1996, p. 30; see also
Singh 1994).
The shift towards civilian supremacy in the conduct of foreign affairs in
post-1998 Indonesia ﬁrst gained momentum with the selection of Abdurrahman
Wahid as president in October 1999. Wahid immediately asserted his authority
over the military with a series of bold appointments and rotations at the high-
est levels of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI; National Armed Forces of
Indonesia). While it is likely that the Armed Forces will try to hold on to the dwi
fungsi concept and maintain political power and inﬂuence over decision-making
in domestic politics for the time being,6 the military’s reduced leverage over the
conduct of foreign policy is already visible, for example with regards to Indonesia’s
participation in the war on terror. The military’s attempt to develop a hard-line
approach in Indonesia’s contribution to the international ﬁght against terrorism
has been markedly softened if not overruled by the government’s reluctance to
upset the Muslim groups. And despite the muscle-ﬂexing of the armed forces in
the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over overlapping territorial claims in
the Sulawesi Sea – the oil and gas rich ‘Ambalat Block’ – in 2005 civilian politicians
rather than generals took the lead in trying to de-escalate and resolve one of the
country’s potentially most explosive diplomatic conﬂicts in decades. As a further
5 Author e-mail conversation with Hadiwinata, August 2005. Hadiwinata is a professor of interna-
tional relations at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, Indonesia, and a leading expert on
Indonesian foreign policy.
6 The gradual reduction of the TNI’s sociopolitical role during the Wahid presidency did not reach
the stage of a “pact” between civilian and military actors that would have taken away the TNI’s
footing in political interventions. Furthermore, the reform process came to a standstill if not a
drawback after Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in 2001. While the election of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono Indonesia’s ﬁrst directly elected head of state in the October 2004 landslide
win against Megawati, seemed to pave the way for a continuation of Wahid’s reform program
(despite Yudhoyono’s military background), the fundamental problem remains that the military
is driven by the necessity to meet its ﬁnancial requirements. According to Hadi Soesastro (2003)
the military gets no more than 30 percent of its funds from the national budget. The necessity of
the military to look for its own money is the source of much evil in the country. Similarly, the
inability of the government to ﬁnance the military limits the ability of the government to impose
effective civil control.
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indicator of the armed forces’ reduced grip on foreign relations, senior ambas-
sadorial appointments do not longer go to senior ofﬁcers of the armed forces but
career diplomats. High-ranking personnel in the MFA agree that foreign policy
making is now much more complex than during authoritarian days. When in
the past the MFA would simply follow the unitary opinion of the president and
Lemhannas, ofﬁcials now have to listen to different opinions from the president,
the Parliament, and the military.
Similar to the Indonesian case the changing political role of the military in
Thailand has contributed to a rising proﬁle for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA). While the Foreign Minister is traditionally not among the most powerful
members within the hierarchy of the Thai cabinet, the MFA has the most modern
leadership structures and best educated bureaucrats of all Thai ministries. Apart
from short periods the Ministry had been in the shadow of the Armed Forces in
past decades. During the Cold War Thailand’s foreign policy followed a realist
pattern, which was based on the primacy of security and directed towards the con-
tainment of Vietnam. This and the role of the military as a legitimate instrument
of state policy contributed to the central position of the Armed Forces in foreign
policy making. As a result of democratization the institutionalization of civilian
control over the armed forces and the subsequent decline of the military’s power
to intervene in politics have signiﬁcantly reduced the generals’ authority over
foreign affairs. An incident in 1993 became the test case for military involvement
in foreign policy. The ﬁrst Chuan Leekpai government allowed eight Nobel
Prize laureates (among them the Dalai Lama) to visit Thailand. Their objective
was to demand that the Burmese junta release Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of
the country’s opposition and 1991 Nobel Prize winner. In the run-up to this
high-level visit, a conﬂict emerged between the government and armed forces, in
particular army chief General Wimol Wongvanich. The armed forces did not
agree to the visit, because they wanted to maintain a smooth relationship with the
Burmese army. Furthermore, as Surachart Bamrungsuk (2001, pp. 80-81) explains,
the Thai army was determined to keep its “special relationship” with China,
because of the uncertainty of war and peace in Cambodia at that time and China’s
past assistance to Thailand during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The
generals thought that the presence of the Dalai Lama in Thailand could have a
negative impact on relations with China, but this disagreement did not lead to
a confrontation as in the past. The military made its position clear and sent a
message of disagreement to the government. However, the moment the cabinet
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announced its decision, the army stopped speaking. “This was a good [omen] for
Thai democratization. The military could voice its opinion so long as it did not
threaten to overthrow the government. And the military agreed to stop voicing
its opposition when the cabinet made its ﬁnal decision indicating a certain degree
of civilian control over the military as well as military professionalism” (p. 80).
As well, the 1992 transition to democratic rule incidentally occurred alongside
the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. The main and powerful symbol of
the changing international structures was the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces
from Cambodia, resulting in a normalization of relations between Thailand and
Vietnam and, consequently, the diminishing of a major threat to Thai national
security. No longer did the nation’s armed forces have a major enemy to ﬁght;
neither internal nor external threats seemed to exist any longer in the post-Cold
War era. In this new security environment the military needed to adjust its role
and mission. In sum, the 1992 watershed in Thailand’s political development
helped take control over the ideological content and direction of foreign policy
away from the Thai army, which, during the ﬁnal decade of the Cold War, was
preoccupied with the Vietnamese threat from Cambodia (Kislenko 2002).
However, the MFA did not immediately re-emerge as the central foreign policy
player with the beginning of re-democratization in 1992. Due to frequent changes
of governments and foreign ministers – during the 1990s Thailand had eleven
different foreign ministers – the position of the Ministry was not as strong as
it might have been in the case of continuity at the top. Finally under Foreign
Minister Surin Pitsuwan (1997-2001), the MFA established itself as the undisputed
leader in most foreign policy areas. Surin’s charisma, his outspokenness and new
ideas about a reform of ASEAN contributed to the re-emergence of the Ministry
as Thailand’s diplomatic face to the outside world. At the same time the armed
forces have managed to retain some crucial impact over the conduct of foreign
relations with neighboring countries as a result of the close personal and economic
ties that Thai generals had established in the 1980s with Burmese and Laotian
generals as well as Khmer Rouge leaders during the pro-Vietnamese regime in
Cambodia. These links helped the military to dominate relations with Cambodia
and Burma – and, to a lesser degree, with Laos – long after the foreign affairs
portfolio passed to civilian hands in the early 1990s.
In the Philippines a stronger subordination of the armed forces (AFP) to the
national legislature and a reorientation from an internal police force to an external
defense posture was achieved in the early 1990s during Fidel Ramos’ presidency
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(1992-1998). Generally, most military leaders found civilian supremacy more
difﬁcult to accept with respect to the domestic order than in the case of foreign
relations, a domain that the AFP had never ‘owned’, even not during the martial
law days of the Marcos dictatorship. While the US-supported post-11 September
2001 ﬁght against terrorism in the Philippines, particularly the crackdown on
the Abu Sayyaf group in Mindanao, has once again endowed the Philippine
armed forces with a domestic mission, the civilian supremacy over the military
is institutionalized. That many former military ofﬁcers succeeded in making
the transition to second careers in electoral politics, most prominently President
Fidel Ramos, who served as the deputy staff of the armed forces under Marcos,
is not a contradiction. And it was particularly the Ramos administration that
appointed dozens of retired military ofﬁcers to core civilian positions, including
powerful posts in the Department of Defense and the National Security Council
(NSC). One of the best-known examples is retired brigadier general José Almonte,
a major power broker under Ramos, who served as head of both the NSC and
National Intelligence Coordinating Authority (NICA), and various ambassadorial
posts. Almonte has also been among the most active and inﬂuential foreign policy
makers of the democratic era. While bureaucrat- or politician-turned former
AFP leaders like Almonte have decisively shaped the country’s foreign policy
since 1986 they have done so as individuals who were driven by general strategic
motivations other than the aim to safeguard or even enhance the position of the
military as an institution in foreign affairs. Overall, it can be concluded that with
regards to foreign policy-making, democratization in all three polities has resulted
in growing state autonomy from the armed forces. But has this process been to
the advantage of other core actor groups? Most importantly, has democratization
led to decreasing state autonomy from legislatures that try to exert inﬂuence over
foreign relations?
A Role to Play for Legislatures?
It has been suggested that legislatures are particularly insistent on asserting their
right to inﬂuence foreign policy early on in the process of democratization. “Be-
cause this process is about establishing property rights to policymaking, legislators
are reluctant to concede in the institutional power struggle by allowing the exec-
utive much discretion. In contrast, in established democracies we typically see
extensive delegation (but rarely abdication) to the executive branch” (Martin 1997,
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pp. 68-69). Among the three cases discussed here, the Indonesian example seems
to support most clearly this assumption that newly democratized legislatures are
particularly trying to enhance their authority over foreign policy.
There is reason to assume that the Indonesian parliament challenged President
Gus Dur (Wahid) whenever possible in order to strengthen its position in what
is widely perceived as an ongoing zero-sum game for political power not only in
legislature-executive relations but also between the competing political parties and
their leaders. As Arief Budiman explained at a time when Gus Dur was still in
ofﬁce, the president “seemingly ignores the power composition of Parliament ...
which is controlled by members of other parties. Thus, the Wahid administration
is subject to much turbulence, because it is constantly being attacked by the
political forces that control the legislature” (2001, p. 150). For example, Wahid’s
inability to give formal recognition to Israel was the result of opposition from the
parliament, which in turn was inﬂuenced by demonstrations and societal forces
(Smith, A. 2000, p. 504). Since 1999 the House of People’s Representatives (DPR)
has established a strong interest in foreign policy issues, mainly in the following
areas:
• Indonesia’s relations with the newly independent state East Timor.
• Indonesia’s bilateral relations, in particular with the United States, Australia,
China, Israel, Palestine, Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma.
• Responses to terrorism in the wake of 11 September 2001 and the Bali
bombing of 12 October 2002.
• Preservation of the territorial integrity of the nation (the cases of Aceh and
West Papua).
When Megawati took ofﬁce, it ﬁrst seemed that the DPR would adopt a more
passive role than during the previous government. A report by the Jakarta-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identiﬁed three reasons for an
observed sudden change in approach. According to this view, ﬁrst, most members
of the parliament wanted to slow down after the long process of impeaching
President Wahid. Second, since there was no political indication that Megawati
had been involved in any wrongdoing in terms of collusion, corruption, and
nepotism (referred to as “KKN” in Indonesia), the parliament found it difﬁcult to
attack the new president. Third, immediately after Megawati’s inauguration, the
national policy agenda required the full concentration of the parliament, which
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had to focus on the annual session of the People’s Consultative Assembly in early
November 2001 (CSIS 2002, p. 13). After a brief period of passivity, however,
the DPR quickly re-established a powerful role in foreign policy making as an
effective means of strengthening its institutional position within the political
system. Commission I, which oversees foreign affairs and defense issues, has
been the center of gravity of the parliament’s claim to actorness in foreign re-
lations, and the commission’s head, Yasril Ananta Baharuddin of Golkar,7 has
been among its most prominent faces. The commission challenged Megawati
especially on the issues of Indonesia’s relations with East Timor and Australia. It
is widely believed that Yasril’s radical political stance on Australia and East Timor
was primarily a convenient weapon to attack the Megawati government and to
increase Golkar’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the administration and Megawati’s
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), then the largest faction in the
DPR (Laksama, 21 July 2002). Unlike in Thailand, however, where – as will be
shown – the legislature’s role in foreign policy is tied to the interests and activities
of one senator, the position of the Indonesian parliament is to a markedly higher
degree embedded in the overall institutional context of the political system and
involves a larger number of key actors. Neither has Yasril been the sole legislative
voice of opposition, nor has the parliamentary interest in foreign relations been
conﬁned to Commission I of the DPR. For example, when in September 2002
the commission called for Australian prime minister John Howard to postpone a
visit both Amien Rais, speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly, and Akbar
Tanjung, speaker of the House of People’s Representatives, immediately rendered
support and refused to meet Howard.8 This was a powerful statement of the
entire legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive.
At the same time, the parliament’s foreign policy interest cannot entirely
be reduced to the quest of establishing property rights in executive-legislative
relations. The DPR also sees itself as the guardian and savior of Indonesia’s
7 Under Suharto Golangan Karya (Golkar) was the de facto government party centred on the
functional groups in the Indonesian society. In the current parliament, elected in 2004, Golkar
holds the majority of seats.
8 The Indonesian critisism of Australia is related to Canberra’s role in East Timor and Irian Jaya.
In 1999, the intervention of an Australian-led peacekeeping force into East Timor, which at that
point was still regarded as sovereign Indonesian territory by the government in Jakarta, caused
widespread anti-Australian sentiment. In the following years prominent Indonesian politicians,
including Yasril Ananta Baharuddin, had accused Australia of backing the independence movement
in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya (West Papua).
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independent and active foreign policy. On the basis of this doctrine Indonesia
efﬁciently played the role of a regional leader and was among the most inﬂuential
and diplomatically successful medium powers in international relations until
about the mid-1990s. Since then however, the country’s foreign policy-makers and
diplomats have struggled to put Indonesia back on the map partly due to often
conﬂicting views by the DPR and the administration on the best foreign policy
strategy and the resulting lack of a comprehensive and coherent post-Suharto
interpretation of ‘independent and active’.
Unlike in Indonesia there has not been any indication yet for a decisive active
foreign policy role of the Thai legislature, the bi-cameral National Assembly, in
institutional terms. Not more than two or three senators are keen to get involved
in foreign affairs. While the 1997 Constitution has empowered both the House
of Representatives and Senate vis-à-vis the executive branch of government, the
realpolitik of executive-legislative relations have only gradually and slowly been
changing and this is particularly the case for foreign policy. Furthermore, foreign
affairs rank low within the Assembly’s committee hierarchy in terms of prestige
and, clearly related, political inﬂuence. Membership in the National Assembly’s
Foreign Affairs committees is not attractive to most legislators as the Committees
have nothing to distribute in terms of material resources. The minimal foreign
policy impact of the National Assembly in institutional terms, however, has to be
seen separately from the strong input of individual lawmakers, mainly and most
prominently Senator Kraisak Choonhavan. The chairman of the Senate Foreign
Affairs Committee has developed a strong personal interest in Thailand’s relations
with Burma and human rights issues and is well represented in the national and
international media. Yet, there seems to be little if any coordination between
Kraisak’s foreign policy agenda on the one hand and the MFA and the Prime
Minister on the other to the extent that Kraisak often stands for an alternative
or even parallel foreign policy9 in Thailand’s external relations as the position
of Kraisak and ‘his’ Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Burma demonstrate.
Mainly for economic reasons and due to the prevailing inﬂuence of the armed
forces in the domain of Thai-Burmese relations, the government of Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra retained an appeasement policy towards Burma and signed
several bilateral agreements to provide grants and long-term loans to improve
9 I owe this term to Uwe Solinger, a former advisor to the National Assembly.
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the neighboring country’s infrastructure.10 Kraisak promoted the exact opposite
position and urged the government to “halt all forms of assistance to Burma and
suspend bilateral cooperation until the new Burmese leadership makes a ﬁrm
commitment to national reconciliation and democracy” (The Nation, 21 October
2004). This view has been supported by parts of the Thaksin-critical English
language media in Thailand. Personal rivalries such as the one between Thaksin
and Kraisak (who is the son of former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan)
are of course not uncommon in Thai politics or anywhere else in the world and
are often as much related to policy issues as they are to long-standing competition
among political clans and dynasties. What makes the Thai case almost unique
is the choice of foreign policy as the battleﬁeld. The term parallel foreign policy
seems appropriate to describe the case of Thailand because the international
media often presents Kraisak’s views and initiatives in a way as if they constituted
elements of Thailand’s ofﬁcial foreign policy rather than alternative options.
Coverage of the ASEAN summit in Laos in November 2004 illustrates this point.
The summit was dominated by the controversial issue of ASEAN’s softly-softly
approach towards the military regime in Rangoon. On the eve of the summit
an ASEAN parliamentarian conference in Malaysia discussed the restrictions
on the freedom of movement of Burma’s opposition leaders by the military
junta and urged the regional grouping not to pass its chairmanship to Burma in
2006. This gathering was attended by some of Southeast Asia’s most prominent
parliamentarians, most of whom representing oppositional political parties in
the respective states’ legislatures, such as Kraisak, the Minority Leader of the
Philippine Senate Aquilino Pimentel Jr. and Malaysian opposition leader Lim Kit
Siang. The meeting received extensive media coverage and in some instances its
outcome was wrongly interpreted as an indication that the ASEAN member states
were about to adopt a tougher stance aimed at committing the junta to serious
political change. Such a policy, however, did not materialize at the summit. At the
same time, the example shows that parliamentary interests in foreign affairs have
grown to the extent that they can effectively challenge the views of the executive
branch of government.
This is particularly true for the Philippine legislature. Modeled on the US
example of an intermixture of powers, the 1987 Constitution grants Congress
and especially the Senate a substantial share of authority over the foreign policy
10 For recent trends in Thai-Burmese relations and a review of the Thaksin premiership see McCargo
and Ukrist 2005.
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architecture. For example, the Congress alone can declare a state of war – a
provision that substantially exceeds the authority of the Thai and Indonesian
legislatures – and only the Senate is empowered to ratify international treaties.
One of the most decisive involvements of the legislature in foreign affairs took
place in September 1991 when the Senate blocked the renewal of the Military
Bases Agreement with the United States that would have extended the US military
presence in the country for another ten years in return for US$ 203 million a
year in US aid. Then-President Corazon Aquino initially considered leading a
referendum to overturn the Senate’s decision but later backed away from the plan
and respected the legitimate act of the legislature as granted by the constitution.
This decision not only conﬁrmed the Senate’s inﬂuential role in foreign affairs
but also strengthened the democratic political system in general. The controversy
over the American military presence did not end with the withdrawal of the
US forces in 1991 and resurfaced in the context of American support for the
Philippines in the ﬁght against the Abu Sayyaf bandits and militant insurgency
movements in Mindanao. Members of Congress took the lead in voicing concern
over the possibility of the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and 2002
Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) becoming stepping-stones for
the eventual establishment of a larger and more permanent US military presence
in the Philippines. In a more recent case, in April 2005 the Philippines Senate
passed a motion calling on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
to ban Burma from assuming the organization’s rotating chairmanship in 2006.
The Philippines legislature (as its counterpart in Malaysia) have been instrumental
in leading the push for greater pressure to be exerted on Burma, in the hope
of securing a timetable for democratic reform and the release of pro-democracy
activist Aung San Suu Kyi. While the latter has not been achieved yet, the initiative
was insofar successful as the Burmese government eventually – in a tactically clever
move, as some observers commented – renounced its claim to chairmanship.11
11 For a more detailed account of the legislature’s role in Philippine foreign policy and other examples
for the domestic-international nexus in the conduct of foreign affairs see Pollard 2004.
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The Powerful Role of Public Opinion and Non-State
Actors
The interests of legislatures in the process of foreign policy making and public
opinion are often inter-related. The Indonesian legislature has repeatedly jumped
on the bandwagon of anti-Israeli, anti-Australian and anti-American sentiments in
the electorate. Among the three countries discussed here the Philippine govern-
ment is probably the most receptive to public opinion. One of many examples of
populism in foreign policy-making was the response of freshly re-elected President
Gloria Arroyo to the Iraq hostage crisis in July 2004. Despite immense pressure
from the United States and its allies, particularly Australia, not to give in to the
demands of Iraqi militants, Arroyo decided to withdraw the Philippines troops
from Iraq in exchange for the life of Filipino hostage Angelo de la Cruz. The gov-
ernment met the demands of de la Cruz’ kidnappers from the Khaled ibn al-Walid
Brigade to pull out the 51 troops by 20 July 2004, one month ahead of sched-
ule. One of the country’s most inﬂuential columnists, Amando Doronila (2004),
commented, “Unfazed by the criticism that she pandered to cheap populism, Ms
Arroyo left no doubt that she gave higher priority to domestic interests over the
widely embracing stakes of the Philippines’ major partners in the coalition”.
Increasing openness and transparency of foreign policy decision-making have
also contributed to a stronger societal input in Indonesia and Thailand. The
rapid growth of civil society in both countries implies that foreign policy can
no longer be made in isolation by a small number of insulated political elites.
The democratic environment has resulted primarily in a stronger inﬂuence of
business-related interest groups on foreign relations. Prior to the 1990s, Thai
foreign policy had been formulated independently of the public domain to the
extent that the Foreign Ministry was dubbed ‘the twilight zone’. Pressures, both
external and internal, have opened up foreign policy decision-making to greater
public scrutiny (Kusuma 2001). The democratic environment in Thailand has
resulted primarily in a stronger inﬂuence of business-related interest groups on
foreign relations. At the same time, the activities of pro-democracy and human
rights NGOs and movements, which have emerged in large numbers since the late
1980s, have contributed to the shaping of foreign policy. Prime Minister Chuan
Leekpai’s (1997-2001) foreign policy pronouncement to Parliament in November
1997 outlined a Wilsonian vision of foreign policy by announcing Thailand’s
participation in the global protection and promotion of democratic values and
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human rights. Six years on, in September 2003, under the succeeding Thaksin
government the vision materialized when Thailand sent 420 soldiers to Iraq in an
effort to rebuild the war-wracked country. Unlike in most other countries, which
dispatched troops to Iraq, the military mission was not controversial in Thai
public opinion and widely accepted and supported as the inevitable international
duty of a country that wants to play a prominent and useful role in international
affairs.
While civil society organizations in Thailand, on the whole, do not tend to
challenge foreign policy makers to the extent that it would force the respective
governments to compromise on key agendas, the Indonesian government’s reac-
tion to the “war on terror” has provided an excellent example of the executive’s
dilemma created by the two-level game in a democracy and the new pluralist
nature of foreign policy-making. Apart from refocusing Indonesian foreign policy
on ASEAN, further improvement of Indonesia’s overall good relations with the
United States had been Megawati’s main foreign policy concern, not least for eco-
nomic reasons. The president managed to secure US$530 million in new ﬁnancial
aid that was promised when she visited Washington, D.C., soon after the events
of 11 September 2001. To avoid any damage to Indonesia-US relations, it had been
in the interest of the Megawati government to support the Washington-led war on
terror in Afghanistan. However, pressured by anti-American demonstrations in
the streets of Jakarta and elsewhere, the administration could not go beyond vague
political rhetoric without risking the escalation of public unrest. To Anak Perwita,
“massive reactions of some elements of Indonesian Muslim society towards the
war in Afghanistan and the wave of anti-Western (the US) mass demonstrations
were clear examples of people’s strong willingness to participate in Indonesia’s
foreign policy” (2001, p. 377). Despite Megawati’s initial intention to support a
proposed Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) declaration condemning
international terrorism, the declaration did not materialize, particularly because
domestic constraints prevented the Indonesian (and Malaysian) government from
ofﬁcially sponsoring and signing such a document. Instead, the APEC summit in
Shanghai in October 2001 produced only a very general statement on terrorism.
At the same time, the Indonesian government was concerned that the war in
Afghanistan could increase domestic support for radical Islamic groups, such as
the Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops)
(Perwita 2001, p. 377). Laskar Jihad, a Java-based paramilitary group, was founded
in early 2000 and has been most active in Maluku, where the militant extrem-
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ists intervened on behalf of local Islamic groups in the violent conﬂict between
Muslims and Christians. Although Laskar Jihad has not been able to attract mass
support among Indonesian Muslims and is unlikely to change the character of the
country’s overall moderate approach to Islam, the government takes the group
extremely seriously. What makes Laskar Jihad particularly dangerous from the
ruling elite’s point of view is the fact that as many as 80 percent of its 3,000-10,000
members could be TNI soldiers, as some observers have suggested (Davis 2002,
p. 22). In a situation that resembled a typical two-level game, the Indonesian
government, in formulating its ofﬁcial foreign policy responses in the wake of
11 September 2001 and Washington’s subsequent replies, had to deal with two
conﬂicting positions and realized that it would soon have to undergo a delicate
balancing act. On the one hand, government ofﬁcials loyal to President Megawati
were greatly aware that the devastating event of 11 September 2001 would become
a serious international issue with wide-ranging global policy implications. Hence
it was assumed that Indonesia might not have many choices outside expressing
its support for the US call to counter the threat of terrorism. On the other hand,
the Indonesian administration strongly perceived the need to carefully weigh
its position against possible domestic reactions, particularly from the Muslim
community. There is no doubt that the Megawati government was aware that
Indonesia’s support for the US call for a global war on terrorism was likely to
be construed at home as an act of submission to the United States (Sukma 2003,
p. 132).
By contrast, under the presidencies of Habibie and Wahid, Islam as a core issue
had entered foreign policy only in form, not in substance. Even though Islam
became a signiﬁcant factor in national politics after the fall of Suharto, foreign
policy continued to be subject to constraints imposed by the reality of domestic
weakness and the dilemma of dual identity, namely the fact that Indonesia is a
secular state whose government cannot ignore the fact that the vast majority of
the population are Muslims. “Therefore, any government in Indonesia is obliged
to move beyond strict secularism by taking into account Muslim aspirations but
short of moving towards the establishment of an Islamic state” (Sukma 2003,
p. 22). While the governments of both Habibie and Wahid sought and bore
strong Islamic credentials, they continued to pursue a foreign policy dictated
by the imperative of maintaining good relations with the West. Consequently,
the non-religious character of Indonesian foreign policy was sustained (Sukma
2003, p. 121). This dilemma of dual identity continued to leave its marks on
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Indonesian foreign policy under Megawati, when the nonreligious character of
foreign policy was preserved and reinforced further. Rizal Sukma concludes: “The
Islamic factor serves as a ‘control mechanism’ rather than a primary motivating
factor in Indonesian foreign policy” (2003, p. 142).
While a strong impact of public opinion on foreign policy formulation is
obvious, the degree and importance of think tank consulting is difﬁcult to assess
in the absence of extensive academic research on the topic. In general terms, a
small number of mostly semi-governmental research and university institutes have
inﬂuenced especially ASEAN-related policies in most member states for at least
two decades, and also during times of authoritarian rule. The most prominent
role has been played by the Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),
which are part of the ASEAN-ISIS network, such as the CSIS (Jakarta), the ISIS
in Kuala Lumpur), and the ISIS in Bangkok. ASEAN-ISIS was instrumental in
outlining the concept of the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the establishment of
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a very rare study on policy advisory
institutions in Southeast Asia, Dewi Fortuna Anwar concludes for Indonesia, “it
is premature to argue that the presence of think-tanks has really made a signiﬁcant
contribution to the larger political process and outcomes, for their numbers are
still limited and many have only been established in the last several years. The
case of think-tanks shows that institution-building in Indonesia is still in a highly
formative, transitional stage” (1999, p. 251).
Conclusion: Similar Processes, Different Outcomes
As Skidmore and Hudson’s pluralist/statist model and Putnam’s two-level game
suggest, the structural and institutional framework for the making of foreign
policy under the condition of democracy is on the whole fundamentally different
from the way authoritarian regimes shape their relations with their external
environment. The cases of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines support this
argument. In the absence of institutionalized checks and balances within the
respective political systems, independent legislatures that were more than rubber
stamps of the governments, a free media, and a proactive civil society (with the
partial exception of the Philippines that had always been more advanced in this
regards than its neighbours), the small circles of actors involved in the drafting and
conduct of foreign policy in Indonesia under Suharto, in the Philippines under
Marcos, and in Thailand under subsequent military regimes, normally did not
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need to respond to non-governmental concerns. Consequently, autocratic regimes
could implement foreign policy strategies based on narrowly deﬁned national
interests. In the 1980s, for example, Indonesia’s overriding foreign policy strategy
was aimed at regional leadership, mainly in the context of ASEAN, while the
Philippines’ superseding foreign policy focus was the alliance with the United
States, and Thailand’s main priority was the containment of Vietnam.
In all three instances, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, the process of
democratization has had not only a far-reaching impact on the respective domestic
order but also on the structure, actors and issues in foreign policy-making. Due to
the traumatic experiences of martial law under Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine
Constitution of 1987 establishes a far-reaching system of legislative checks on the
President, including the area of foreign affairs. In contrast, re-democratization in
Thailand has not inﬂuenced the formal structures of the foreign policy process.
The same applies to Indonesia where the provisions on foreign policy-making
in the 1945 Constitution have mainly been left untouched with the exception
of ambassadorial appointments which now require the President to consider the
parliament’s views. At the same time the formal institutionalized rules that govern
the management of foreign affairs say little about the real power relativities and
patterns of inﬂuence among the actors involved. The new democratic environment
in all three states has opened up the foreign policy arena and gives access to a larger
number of actors compared with the days of authoritarian rule, mainly to the
beneﬁt of ministries, other government ofﬁcials and a civilian diplomatic service.
In all three cases the impact of the military on foreign affairs has been signiﬁcantly
reduced. At the same time public opinion has proved to be a decisive factor
pushing the respective executive towards the prominent consideration of business,
human rights and religious issues. The role of the legislature differs from country
to country. Whereas, according to the letter of the constitution, the Congress of
the Philippines is the most powerful legislature of the three in foreign affairs, in
real political terms the Indonesian House of Representative is the most active in
putting its mark on foreign affairs. Lawmakers have successfully challenged or
even vetoed major foreign policy decisions of the post-Suharto administrations.
The bi-cameral National Assembly of Thailand as a whole has not developed
a decisive interest in the country’s external relations but the chairman of the
Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee regularly succeeds in getting international
attention for his government-critical suggestions for a ‘better’ Thai foreign policy.
In sum, general cross-regional assumptions about the role of parliaments in foreign
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policy decision making of newly democratized states can not made in the case
of Southeast Asia. It can be established, however, that the wider spectrum of
actors and the multiplication of special interests pose a major test to the often
inexperienced executives in newly (re-)emerging democratic systems as far as the
making of foreign policy is concerned.
It goes without saying that foreign policy change is not entirely and exclu-
sively driven by internal dynamics. History, issues of political leadership and
above all international structural change and global developments, such as shifting
power relativities and the vanishing of old threat perception and the growing inter-
twinedness of security and economics, play their part, too. After all, the foreign
policies of China and Vietnam have also seen adjustments despite the absence of
far-reaching political liberalization. As this article has shown, what differentiates
autocracies and democracies is the way in which regime accountability constraints
the government’s latitude of decision-making in foreign affairs. In the case of the
authoritarian regimes in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines regime account-
ability tended to be low because the continuity of the respective governments
was not linked to the legislative process, elections, judicial decision, or even the
regimes performance. Hence, accountability did not impose a signiﬁcant limi-
tation on foreign policymaking. In contrast, democratization increased regime
accountability and, as a result, has increasingly restricted the post-authoritarian
governments’ leeway in determining and implementing foreign policy goals. In
short, while the conduct of foreign policy was almost free of domestic constraints
in an authoritarian regime, in a democracy foreign policy choices are linked to
their perceived effect on the decision-maker’s political standing and the views of
constituencies.
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